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Tor Metrics
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Users

We estimate the number of users by analyzing the requests induced by clients to relays and bridges.

  • Relay users
  • Bridge users by country
  • Bridge users by transport
  • Bridge users by country and transport
  • Bridge users by IP version
  • BridgeDB requests by requested transport
  • BridgeDB requests by distributor
  • Top-10 countries by relay users
  • Top-10 countries by possible censorship events
  • Top-10 countries by bridge users
  • “The anonymous Internet”
Relay users graph

This graph shows the estimated number of directly-connecting clients; that is, it excludes clients connecting via bridges. These estimates are derived from the number of directory requests counted on directory authorities and mirrors. Relays resolve client IP addresses to country codes, so that graphs are available for most countries. Furthermore, it is possible to display indications of censorship events as obtained from an anomaly-based censorship-detection system (for more details, see this technical report). For further details check the documentation on Reproducible Metrics.

Download graph as PNG or PDF.

Download data as CSV.

Learn more about the CSV data format or how to reproduce the graph data.

Related events

The following events have been manually collected in the metrics-timeline Git repository and might be related to the displayed graph.

Dates Places/Protocols Description and Links
2016-07-18 ipv4 ipv6 geoip and geoip6 databases updated to "July 6 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country" (geoip-db-digest 19FC902B6A860BA7E4BADCB5404482995F7E0763, geoip6-db-digest 7E717154718F2065240B90F8132F305AF78C9A9D).
commit
2016-07-15 Turkey <OR> Coup attempt in Turkey. A paper (§ 4.1) reports a decline in Tor users.
paper relay graph
2016-07-07 Zimbabwe Four-hour block of WhatsApp in Zimbabwe.
article
2016-06-12 ipv4 ipv6 geoip and geoip6 databases updated to "June 7 2016 Maxmind GeoLite2 Country" (geoip-db-digest DA31976A9C7D48C2C16EA70BCE9006772A0F4A34, geoip6-db-digest FF1DD08CA9EB6528E1A6389E7154BD9586F24370).
commit
2016-06-01 Kazakhstan <OR> obfs4 Kazakhstan blocks vanilla Tor TLS. Users mostly switch to obfs4.
ticket
2015-12-31 to 2020-06-04 Mexico The Telmex ISP in Mexico blocks seven directory authorities.
mailing list post article

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This material is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-0959138. Any opinions, finding, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. "Tor" and the "Onion Logo" are registered trademarks of The Tor Project, Inc.. Data on this site is freely available under a CC0 no copyright declaration: To the extent possible under law, the Tor Project has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights in the data. Graphs are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License.