“Tor metrics are the ammunition that lets Tor and other security advocates argue for a more private and secure Internet from a position of data, rather than just dogma or perspective.”
— Bruce Schneier (June 1, 2016)
Country and ISP diversity are approximated by resolving IP addresses to a country code and an autonomous system. We process the capabilities and properties relays and bridges reported to directory authorities.
The following graph visualizes diversity of currently running relays in terms of their probability to be selected for circuits. Fast relays with at least 100 Mbit/s bandwidth capacity, and which therefore have a high probability of being selected for circuits, are represented by an onion; smaller relays are shown as a simple dot; and the slowest relays, which are almost never selected for circuits, are omitted entirely. Graphs in the "all relays" category use a relay's consensus weight as probability, whereas graphs in the "exits only" category use a value derived from a relay's consensus weight that resembles the probability of selecting that relay as exit node. All graphs support grouping relays by same autonomous system, contact information, country, or network family.
This material is supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS-0959138. Any opinions, finding, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. "Tor" and the "Onion Logo" are registered trademarks of The Tor Project, Inc.. Data on this site is freely available under a CC0 no copyright declaration: To the extent possible under law, the Tor Project has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights in the data. Graphs are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License.